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This paper test farm households’ joint decisions to work off-farm, and their investments in 
farm capital respectively, using a farm level data set involving 252 sole proprietorships in 
Southwestern Minnesota. Time series are collected from the period 1993 through 2002 and 
estimation is done using a recursive two-step simultaneous censored equations model. Strong 
support is found for endogeneity of farm capital in an off-farm reliance model. Off-farm 
income, on the other hand, has no explanatory power in a farm capital model. In addition, 
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Off-farm work and off-farm investment by farm households has increased steadily over 
several decades. Census data for 2000 reveals a threefold increase in off-farm work since 
1987, with net farm income constituting less than a third of the household income in 1999 
(Mishra et al., 2002). The primary reasons for the increased reliance on off-farm income are 
to: spread income risks, increase total income (Mishra and El-Osta, 2001 and references 
therein), and stabilize consumption possibilities over time. 
Off-farm labor participation of farm households have been extensively analyzed (e.g. 
Lass, Findeis, Hallberg, 1991) and recent work has addressed off-farm income and 
investments in farm and nonfarm assets (Andersson et al., 2005); wealth accumulation of farm 
households (Mishra and El-Osta, 2005); the allocation of investments funds by farm 
households (Mishra and Morehart, 2001; Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone, 2004; Davies et 
al., 2005). Less attention, however, has been directed at integrating capital accumulation with 
labor allocation. Recognizing the endogeneity of capital stock in analyses of off-farm income 
is particularly important in a period of structural change within the agricultural sector. Off-
farm work participation and investments in farm capital influences the farmer’s earnings and 
contributes to accumulation of human and physical capital. Ahituv and Kimhi (2002) used an 
Israeli data set for 1971 and 1981 and formulated household off-farm labor decision as a 
multinominal choice model. They report a strong negative association between off-farm labor 
supply and farm capital stock, indicating that the two variables can move in opposite 
directions because capital increases the marginal productivity of family labor, and the other 
way around. We are not aware of any other work that has conducted a joint analysis of 
farmer’s decisions to work off-farm, and their investments in farm capital.  
The purpose of this paper is to test farm household joint decisions to work off-farm, and 
their investments in farm capital using a farm level data set involving 252 sole proprietorships 
  1in Southwestern Minnesota (Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management 
Association). Time series are collected from the period 1993 through 2002 and estimation is 
done using a recursive two-step simultaneous censored equations model. An important 
advantage from this data set is that we observe the differences in the behavior of the farm 
household over a relatively long time period. 165 proprietorships are represented in the data 
set with 4 or more consecutive observations. This allows us in particular to address the issue 
of persistence of farm households in a true off-farm labor state dependence, in which past 
behavior has a casual connection with present behavior. Work by Ahituv and Kimhi (2002); 
Corsi and Findies (2000) have found support for true state dependence but both of these 
studies are limited to involve data from only two non-consecutive time periods. Evidence of 
true state dependence would imply rigidity in off-farm labor adjustment. 
 
Empirical models and estimation strategy 
Farm household models suggest that farm production and off-farm labor decisions are likely 
to be simultaneous (Nakajima, 1986; Phimister and Roberts, 2002). Following Huffman’s 
seminal work and work by e.g. Skoufias (1996); Ahituv and Kimhi (2002), the empirical 
model in this study presupposes that the farm household maximizes lifetime income derived 
from farm and off-farm sources, given a time constraint. Farm production is a function of 
various characteristics including farm work, intrinsic ability, farm-specific human capital, 
physical capital, and fixed inputs. This modeling framework suggests that the time-allocation 
between off- and farm work and capital investment is interrelated. Moreover, a time 
dependence in off-farm work is suggested so that a farm household that had off-farm income 
in the past is more likely to persist in that state. 
The empirical model developed in this section follows a reduced form methodology that 
uses general predictions from the economic models outlined above to guide the empirical 
  2work. Our model specification follows the general specification in Maddala (1983) for a 
simultaneous equations model stated in continuous dependent variables before censoring. Our 
model includes one off-farm labor supply model that is estimated jointly with a farm capital 
accumulation model. Our goal is to estimate the likelihood of farm household reliance on off-
farm income and to address the issue of interrelation between off-farm income reliance and 
farm capital accumulation. In addition, because not every farm household has off-farm 
income, a censoring issue underlies the empirical model. A central issue here is whether farm 
capital is endogenous to off-farm income reliance. As a preliminary test of our approach we 
estimated the system 
ε γ 1 2 1 1* + + ′ = = y y tobit x β  (off-farm income) 
ε 2 2 + = ′ x π 2 2 y   (farm capital) 
where exogeneity of y2 is tested by a t-test of the hypothesis that  σ σ
2
2 12 = Ψ  eqals zero 
(Greene, 2002). Our data clearly rejects exogeneity (p-value = 0.0153). 
In order to allow for endogeneity of off-farm income in the formation of farm capital as 
well as endogeneity of farm capital in the off-farm income model we apply a two step 
maximum likelihood procedure following Blundell and Smith (1986); Greene (2002, section 
E21.6.2). Formally, the model structure is 
capital)   (farm    
income)   farm - (off   
2 1 2 2
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where [ ] ε ε 2 1, i s   () ( ) [ ] σ σ σ 12 22 11 , , , 0 , 0 BVN . The dependent variable in the off-farm income 
model is censored at lower limit ( ) 0 = Li but the dependent variable in the farm capital 
equation is observed without censoring. 
  3The two step procedure is done in two joint parts. In the first part the focus in on 
estimating( ) β1 , 1 γ . In the first step here,  β x 2 i2 = π 2  is estimated by ordinary least square 
regression on  . The second step then estimates  y2 σ γ 11 1 , ,β1  by maximum likelihood in the 
censored regression model in the off-farm income equation while correcting for the 
asymptotic covariance matrix (Murphy and Topel, 1985). Analogously, in the second part, to 
estimate ( ) β2 , 2 γ  we first estimate  β x 1 i1 = π1  by maximum likelihood using the censored 
off-farm income equation, and then apply predicted values together with   in an ordinary 
least square regression of   while correcting for the asymptotic covariance matrix (Murphy 
and Topel, 1985). 
xi2
y2
The dependent variable in the off-farm income model is the annual share of off-farm 
wages, salaries and business income (ofwsbi) to the total of ofwsbi and net cash farm income 
to the farm household. This measure is believed to represent the degree of reliance of off-farm 
income sources in a more direct way than hours worked off-farm and work status which are 
the typical dependent variables used in the off-farm work-choice literature (e.g. Mishra and 
Goodwin, 1997). Moreover, as this share is a continuous variable, this makes our dependent 
variable different from binary choice models typical in off-farm labor estimations. This, 
choice of dependent variable, however implies that data has to be considered as cross-section 
as dynamic tobit models allowing for endogeneity of explanatory variables, to our knowledge, 
do not exist in the present literature. Thus, we will, by the chosen procedure, not be able to 
disentangle the state dependence of off-farm income into a true state component and a 
component related to a persistence due to individual heterogeneity.  
Figure 1 shows the annual relative changes in main sources of income to farm households 
in the sample against corresponding levels in 1993. In absolute levels, the share of ofwsbi to 
the total of ofwsbi and net cash farm income increased from 14.8 percent in 1993 to 22.5 
  4percent in 2002. The Southwestern Minnesota data used in this study is in this respect similar 
to the National averages for large and very large farms, which in 1999 revealed a 40.4 percent 
and 17.7 percent off-farm income share of total farm operator household income, respectively 
(USDA, ARMS). We also observe that the share of farm households that do not report any 
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Figure 1. Relative changes in sources of farm household income and farm assets. 
Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Records 1993-2002. 
 
The dependent variable in the capital accumulation model is the log of the real value of 
total farm assets. Figure 1 also portrays the annual relative changes in total farm assets 
between 1993 and 2002. Overall, the value of real farm capital has increased with 29 percent 
between 1993 and 2002. 
Descriptions and summary statistics for each variable used in the empirical model are 
reported in Table 1. 
  5The independent variables used in the off-farm work model include operator and farm 
household characteristics such as operator’s age; experience; farm household measures; non-
farm investments; farm characteristics; government payments; state dependence in off-farm 
income reliance; and finally a local labor market component.  
Analyses of off-farm labor supply typically include proxies for personal and/or household 
characteristics to estimate structural farm household models in a reduced methodology. 
Several studies report that younger farmers are more likely to work off-farm (e.g. Ahituv and 
Kimhi, 2002; McNamara and Wiess, 2005; Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre, 2006; Benjamin 
and Kimhi, 2006); that farm experience is negatively related to off-farm work (e.g. Mishra 
and Goodwin, 1997; Mishra and Holthausen, 2002). In addition, existing studies have failed 
to find a significant relationship between household size and off-farm work participation (e.g. 
Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Ahearn et al., 2006). Mishra and Goodwin (1997), however 
reports that farm household with younger children are more likely to seek off-farm work. We 
two include variables related to the farm household as such. First, the number of total family 
members is included. A larger farm household might be more likely to rely on off-farm 
income because the family can operate the farm as well as have one or more family members 
working off-farm. Moreover, a larger family reasonably implies presence of children. Second, 
we include family living expenses as an explanatory variable. We hypothesize that higher 
living expenses, either as a result of a larger farm household or by seeking a higher standard 
of living, is positively related to off-farm reliance. 
Investments in non-farm assets have grown in importance for US farm households. 
Mishra and Morehart (2001) report that average total financial assets increased with 51% 
between 1992 and 1995. At the same time average non-financial assets increased with 9.4%. 
Among the financial assets investment in stock, bonds, and IRA’s more than doubled during 
1992-1995 (Mishra and Morehart). In addition, Mishra and Morehart found that farms with 
  6off-farm income are more likely to invest off the farm. While a growing amount of studies 
have analyzed determinants of off-farm investments less attention has been given to what 
extent off-farm investments determines decisions to work off-farm. Ahearn et al. (2006) 
reports that off-farm interest and dividend income is positively related to off-farm work and 
this might suggest that a positive relation between off-farm investment and off-farm work 
might be expected. To our knowledge, the relationships among off-farm labor and off-farm 
investment have not been examined in the literature. In this study, non-farm investment is 
represented with five categories as the form of the wealth portfolio of farm households with 
and without off-farm income is likely to be different (Mishra and Morehart, 2001). We 
hypothesize that farm household’s that, for one or another reason, invest in an off-farm wealth 
portfolio might seek off-farm income as a complement to farm income to alleviate farm 
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Figure 2. Annual relative changes in non-farm investment and family living expenses. 
Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Records 1993-2002. 
 
  7Four farm characteristics are included in the off-farm labor model. First, farm size is 
included as it has been found to be negatively related to off-farm labor decisions (Ahituv and 
Kimhi, 2002; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006). As noted by Goodwin and Bruer (2003) farm 
households operating larger farm might be less likely to seek off-farm income as the on-farm 
effort required to operate a larger farm is influenced by the size of the operation. Second, we 
include the tenure share as farm households might have different objectives and face different 
economic constraint in off-farm work participation given the ownership status of the farm 
operated. Work by Tavernier, Temel and Li (1997); Mishra and Holthausen (2002) found that 
off-farm work participation was negatively related to the degree of farm ownership. Third, it 
is standard in off-farm work participation model to include a dummy variable for whether or 
not the farm operation specializes in dairy. The idea is that more labor demanding types of 
farm operations will have a lower off-farm participation rate. Ahearn et al. (2006), using an 
extended set of five specialization categories, indeed found that specialization in dairy was 
negatively related to the operator off-farm participation while specialization into cash crops; 
beef and hog; and other livestock were positively related to off-farm labor participation. In 
this study, we include four specialization dummies defined in accordance with the Farm 
Business records from which data is provided on the basis of the farm having 60 percent or 
more of sales from a given category. Fourth, government payments are included. Recent work 
by Ahearn et al. (2006) focusing on individual participation in off-farm labor market based on 
ARMS data and work by Shrestha and Findeis (2005) focusing on the off-farm employment 
rate based on county-level data have found evidences of a negative relation between 
government payments and off-farm employment for U.S. overall, and a mixed relationship 
when examining this relationship by type of payment on a regional basis. Fifth, the leverage 
position was found by Mishra and Goodwin (1997) to be a determinant of off-farm labor 
supply. In the present study we maintain the hypothesis that farm households with farm 
  8financial difficulties might be more likely to seek off-farm work in order to sustain them 
selves. A variant of Altman’s (1968) original ZPROB specification is included as a predictor 
of financial distress in the farm operation as the leverage position by itself is not a direct 
measure of to what extent the farm family might seek off-farm income to alleviate financial 
problems. For two observations our predictive measure turned up to be negative. Farmers with 
negative values of this measure are most likely to experience financial difficulties. Since the 
predictive measure is constructed so that higher values imply lower profitability, negative 
values would introduce a bias in the results and therefore these observations were excluded 
from the final sample. 
To address the issue of state dependence in off-farm income reliance we include the 
lagged share of ofwsbi to total household income as an explanatory variable. Work by Corsi 
and Findeis (2000); Ahituv and Kimhi (2002) suggest that previous off-farm labor state is 
relevant in off-farm labor participation choices. 
Finally, county population density is included as a proxy for local labor market 
characteristic. We hypothesize that this density is positively related to off-farm work 
accessibility and negatively related to various transaction costs related to seeking off-farm 
work. Previous studies have recognized the importance of various local economic effects such 
as the structure of local labor market (Hearn, McNamara, and Gunter, 1996; Ahearn et al., 
2006) and county differences in volatility in off-farm wages (Goodwin and Bauer, 2003). 
Results from Mishra and Goodwin (1997) support that distance to town are negatively related 
to off-farm labor supply. The recent study by Ahearn et al. (2006), however, found that local 
area variables like unemployment rate¸ employment in specific industries, and urbanization 
were rather unimportant in explaining off-farm labor participation likelihood. 
The independent variables used in the capital model include operator characteristics such 
as operator’s age and experience, farm size, tenure share, and government payments. Farm 
  9specialization is represented by dummy variables for farms specialized in crop, dairy, hog, 
and beef production, respectively. Farm operation efficacy is represented by the operating 
profit margin and the asset turnover rate. The financial status of the farm operation is 
represented by the debt-to-asset ratio, the interest burden, and the effective interest rate on 
debt, and the predictive measure of financial distress, respectively. 
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Table 1. Definition and descriptive statistics of variables in models estimated 
Variable  
names 
Definitions Mean  Standard 
deviation 
sofwsbi  Share of off-farm wages, salaries and business income to the 
total of off-farm wages, salaries and business income and net 
cash farm income 
0.219 1.446 
log tfa  Log of real total farm assets
a 5.85 0.294 
op age  Age of senior operator  47.1  10.58 
yif  Years in farming for senior operator  24.08  10.53 
flivexp  Real family living expenses
b ($)  31,709  14,627 
memb Number  of  family  members  3.52  1.60 
nfssb  Real non-farm savings, stocks, and bonds
b ($)  17,532  63,293 
nfra  Real non-farm retirement accounts
b ($)  23,420  51,303 
nfre  Real non-farm real estate
b ($)  37,893  47,825 
nfli  Real non-farm life insurance
b ($)  10,059  16,534 
nfd  Real non-farm debt
b ($)  10,058  21,964 
acres  Total acres operated  635.2  345.7 
tensh  Tenure share. The share of rented land to the sum of owned and 
rented land). 
0.626 0.307 
dcrop  Dummy for specialized crop production (=1 if more than 60 
percent of farm gross sales is from crop production; 0 
otherwise) 
0.467 0.499 
ddairy  Dummy for specialized dairy production (=1 if more than 60 
percent of farm gross sales is from dairy production; 0 
otherwise) 
0.02 0.14 
dhog  Dummy for specialized hog production (=1 if more than 60 
percent of farm gross sales is from hog production; 0 otherwise) 
0.074 0.262 
dbeef  Dummy for specialized beef production (=1 if more than 60 
percent of farm gross sales is from beef production; 0 otherwise) 
0.059 0.236 
opm  Operating Profit Margin (return to farm assets divided by value 
of farm production). Value of farm production is gross farm 
income minus feeder livestock purchased and adjusted for 
inventory changes in crops, market livestock and breeding 
livestock. 
0.195 0.219 
atr  Asset Turnover Rate (value of farm production divided by 
average farm assets). 
0.32 0.2 
dar  Debt to Asset Ratio. Total Farm Liabilities divided by Total 
Farm Assets. 
0.393 0.236 
iburd  Interest burden. Interest expenses (cash) divided by gross cash 
farm income minus cash operating expense. 
0.084 8.90 
eintr  Effective interest rate on debt. Interest expense (cash) divided 
by average total farm liabilities. 
0.063 0.03 
gpts  Real government payments (all types)
b ($)  24,942  22,973 
z-1  Predictor of financial distress. Equals Total Farm Assets divided 
by the sum of 3.3 times net farm income before extraordinary 
items plus operating expenses plus 1.4 times retained earnings 
plus 1.2 times net working capital (i.e. total farm current assets 
minus total farm current liabilities).  
0.54 0.282 
popden  County population density. County population divided with 
county area (acres). Data source: Minnesota Department of 
Administration 
0.033 0.0094 
aGross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator used for deflation (www.economagic.com) 




  11Results 
The data used in this study are obtained from the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business 
Management Association. The sample includes data from 252 sole proprietorships. Time 
series are collected from the period 1993 through 2002. Our working sample includes 1452 
observations. An important advantage from this data set is that we observe the differences in 
the behavior of the farm household over a relatively long time period. 165 proprietorships are 
represented in the data set with 4 or more consecutive observations. We will first present the 
off-farm income reliance results, and then present the farm capital stock results 
 
Off-farm income equation 
Parameter estimates for the off-farm income share model are reported in Table 2. The sign of 
the lagged share of off-farm income is positive and highly significant. This suggests that a 
farm household that to a higher extent have relied on off-farm income in the past is more 
likely to persist in such income dependence in the future. Reasons for such state dependence 
might include higher off-farm wages for those with more off-farm work experience, which 
affect the opportunity cost of farm work. Farm size as well as farm capital has a negative 
impact on the off-farm income share, and the impact of farm capital is stronger than that of 
farm size (by acres). The latter finding is central to the question of endogeneity of capital 
stock to off-farm labor decisions. Our finding is consistent with the Israeli results by Ahtiuv 
and Kimhi (2002) for off-farm work participation, as well as with the results by Goodwin and 
Bauer (2003), which reported that larger firms implies less off-farm employment.  
The coefficients of age of senior farm operator (opage) and age squared (opage
2) 
corroborates the familiar nonlinear effect of age reported in off-farm work participation 
studies. The latter finding is also supported by the negative relation found between off-farm 
income share and the number of years spent as a farmer.  
  12The results for the two farm household characteristics included in the model are mixed. 
Family living expenses is, as expected, positively and significantly related to the off-farm 
income share but the household size, although estimated with a positive sign, is not 
significant. The latter result also suggests that off-farm income reliance is more related to 
standards of living than to the household size by itself. 
Moreover, investments in non-farm assets are also found to have a mixed impact on off-
farm income reliance. Only investment in retirement accounts is significant at the 5 percent 
level. The other four non-farm asset categories included are not significant at any 
conventional level. 
In addition, a positive and significant relationship between the off-farm income share and 
farm tenure share is found. The positive sign for this coefficient is inconsistent with earlier 
studies based on national (Tavernier et al., 1997) or shorter farm household data sets (Mishra 
and Goodwin, 1997). One reason for the positive relationship found in the present study is 
that farm enterprises with a higher tenure share operates a lower value of the farm capital 
stock, which makes them more likely to seek off-farm work. This is further confirmed in the 
subsequent presentation of the estimates for the farm capital stock equation. 
Only farm specialization in crop production is significantly and positively related to the 
off-farm income share. Specialized dairy and hog operations are typically more labor 
intensive than crop enterprises and although the coefficients for these farm type 
specializations are negative, as expected, they are not statistically significant. Specialization 
in beef production is, according to the data, not related to the dependent variable.  
No significant relationship between the off-farm income share and the amount of 
government payment or population density is revealed. The first result is inconsistent with 
earlier results. The sign of the coefficient for government payments is, however, positive and 
this is consistent with work by Shrestha and Findeis (2005) who based on county-level data 
  13found the effect on other federal programs (OFP) on off-farm employment to be positive in 
the Northern Crescent and Eastern Uplands, i.e. opposite against the results for U.S. overall. 
To investigate to what extent the result obtained is due to the passage of the 1996 policy 
change the model were re-estimated over the 1993-1996 period, without any observed major 
changes with respect to the coefficient related to government payments.  
Finally, and interestingly, the predictive measure of farm financial distress (z-1) has a 
positive and highly significant effect on off-farm income reliance. 
 
Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates (Tobit) of off-farm income share by farm households 
in Southwestern Minnesota, 1993-2002 
Variable Coefficient  p-value 
intercept 0.352  0.347 
lag-1 shofwsbi  0.08  < 0.0001 
log tfa  -0.21  0.0001 
opage 0.035  0.022 
opage
2 - 0.0003  0.0782 
yif -  0.015  0.0016 
flivexp 0.3*10
-5 0.041 











acres -0.00037  <  0.0001 
tensh 0.21  0.0001 
dcrop 0.178  <  0.0001 
ddairy -0.135  0.2941 
dhog -0.026  0.7153 
dbeef 0.0004  0.9960 
gpts 0.128*10
-5 0.1878 
z-1 0.532  <  0.0001 
popden -1.99  0.3044 
    
σ   0.601 0.000 
Log-likelihood -1,163.034  
No. observations  1,338   
 
  14Capital equation 
Parameter estimates for the off-farm income share model are reported in Table 3. The model 
explains 82% of the variation in the capital stock in sampled farm operations. The variable of 
special interest in this study is that measuring the explanatory power of the off-farm income 
share to the capital stock. The results, however, suggest that off-farm income reliance do not 
provide any such explanation. A negative relation, implying that off-farm income do not 
increase farm capital accumulation, could have been expected if farm households were subject 
to borrowing or capital constraints (Reardon, 1997). Conversely, a positive relation would 
have implied that funds earned outside of the farm operation were re-invested in the farm 
enterprise. It is noted, however, that the predictive measure of financial distress (z-1) is 
positively related to the capital stocks. This suggests that larger farms (by capital) are more 
financially vulnerable. 
The coefficient of farm size (by acres) is small but positive, implying that on average, 
land and capital are complements. In addition, the farm operator age characteristics reveal a 
nonlinear but not statistically significant relationship, while it is noted that the impact of 
number of years in farming is not significant as well. Tenure share has a negative and 
significant effect on farm capital accumulation. This is of relevance for the off-farm income 
model as smaller firms are more likely to be more dependent on off-farm income.  
Farm specialization has a mixed effect on capital accumulation depending on farm type. The 
coefficient for farm specializing in crop production has a negative and significant effect on 
the capital stock, while specialization in dairy; hog; and beef production is found positively 
related to capital intensity. However, the results for dairy operation are not significant. 
 
  15Table 3. Ordinary least square estimates for determinants of capital stock by farm households 
in Southwestern Minnesota, 1993-2002 
Variable Coefficient  p-value 
intercept 5.618  <  0.0001 
sofwsbi -0.005  0.9865 




yif 0.001  0.3637 
acres 0.0005  <  0.0001 
tensh -0.178  <  0.0001 
dcrop -0.074  <  0.0001 
ddairy 0.027  0.2888 
dhog 0.084  <  0.0001 
dbeef 0.105  <  0.0001 
opm 0.139  <  0.0001 
atr -0.624  <  0.0001 
dar -0.086  <  0.0001 
iburd 0.0008  0.0276 
eintr 0.296  0.0129 
gpts 0.54*10
-5 0.0061 
z-1 0.101  <  0.0001 
    
R
2 (adjusted R
2) 0.824  (0.822)   
F-value (p-value) 358.18  (<0.0001)   
No. observations  1318   
 
Farm capital efficacy measures are also significant in explaining capital accumulation. 
The coefficient of the operating profit margin is positive while the coefficient for the asset 
turnover rate is negative. The positive relation between the first driving factors of return to 
farm assets is expected as more profitable operations are more likely to grow larger. The 
negative relation between the asset turnover rate and capital stocks is also reasonable as 
capital rationing is a known strategy to increase the turnover rate. 
Financial characteristics are significant in explaining capital accumulation. First, it is 
noted that the coefficient of the debt-to-asset ratio is negative implying that more capital 
intensive farm operations have lower leverage than less capital intensive operations. Second, 
both the interest burden as well as the effective interest rate on farm liabilities is positively 
and significantly related to capital intensity. Although, this findings are mutually consistent 
  16they are less obviously consistent with that larger farm operations would have a lower 
leverage.  




Using a censored simultaneous estimation of farm level data, we evaluate the role of farm 
operator characteristics; farm household measures; non-farm investments; farm 
characteristics; farm capital efficacy; farm financial status; state dependence in off-farm 
income reliance; and finally a local labor market component in off-farm income reliance and 
capital accumulation. A novel feature of this study is that we investigate the joint decisions by 
farm households to work off-farm, and their farm capital accumulation. With the exception of 
the work by Ahituv and Kimhi (2002) the literature on off-farm labor supply seems to have 
overlooked the possible endogeneity of farm capital in off-farm labor decisions, and vice 
versa. Several important results are found. 
The results strongly suggest that there is a negative relation between off-farm income 
reliance and farm capital accumulation. This likely implies that many part-time farmers or 
farm household operating smaller farm units to a larger extent relies on off-farm income 
compared to full-time operators or larger farm units. The association between off-farm 
income and farm capital has important policy implications. Agricultural policy affects both 
rural and urban labor markets and labor market policy tends to spill over to the farm sector. In 
addition, encouraging, or impeding, specific forms of agricultural production such as part-
time farming necessitates understanding about the causality between off-farm income and 
farm capital, in particular because policies cannot be easily reversed. 
  17Second, there is support for true state dependence in off-farm income reliance. As noted 
by Corsi and Findeis (2000) this implies that off-farm labor adjustments will be more rigid 
than without such dependence and that, although farm households might seek off-farm 
income to counteract farm income volatility, this dependence likely reflect that off-farm 
income are critical to the financial well-being of many farm households. A related result is 
that government payments are found to be weakly positively related to off-farm income 
reliance and strongly positively related to capital intensity. The relationship between 
government payments and off-farm income reliance supports the finding by Shrestha and 
Findeis (2005) that from county-level data found that the income effect of government 
payments is specific to region. Our results is insensitive to presence of more decoupled 
payments following the 1996 FAIR and this is in line with the recent results by Ahearn et al. 
(2006) showing that the observed nationwide increase in off-farm labor participation was not 
the results of the changes of government subsidies following the 1996 reform of agricultural 
policy. We conclude that it is not unlikely that a farm household that is allowed to plan the 
production organization more flexible, while still receiving support, will accommodate into 
seeking more off-farm work as many farm households to a large extent depend on off-farm 
income as a source for their cash income. Yet another related result is that farm households 
predicted to be in farm financial distress are more likely to rely on off-farm income. 
Third, while an emerging literature has provided result on determinants of off-farm 
investment little attention has been given to the role of off-farm investment in explaining off-
farm work participation or off-farm income reliance. While including five non-farm asset 
categories typically held by farm household we found that only investments in non-farm 
retirement accounts is related to off-farm reliance at conventional significance levels. The 
latter result is reasonably as pension plans might be included in off-farm employment 
contracts. This, however, further accentuates the rigidity in off-farm work adjustments. 
  18Fourth, and finally, the estimation of the capital accumulation model suggests that farm 
financial such as leverage; interest burden; effective interest rate on farm debt; and financial 
distress, as well as farm capital efficacy factors such as operating profit margin and asset 
turnover rate contributes in explaining farm capital growth and therefore indirectly has effect 
on off-farm income reliance.  
Taken together, the results obtained in this study is of use in understanding: who will be 
likely to rely on off-farm income? And: will income from off-farm work be used to expand 
the farm operation?  
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